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Introduction
Global Issues in Compensatory Justice
Penelope E Andrews
The intersection of racial, ethnic or gender identity with social and
economic disadvantage raises troubling questions and elusive resolution.
Politicians and policy makers, committed to social justice in their
particular countries, have for many decades attempted to redress
persistent patterns of subordination and discrimination by recourse to,
and within the accepted parameters of, their legal systems. A variety of
legal scholars have contributed to the discourse of legal equality in the
latter half of this century, including civil rights theorists (Greenberg,
1994), critical legal scholars (Kairys, 1978), critical race theorists
(Delgado, 1995), and feminists (Bartlett and Kennedy, 1991). Much of
the discussion has been critical of the law's inability to adequately
address structural discrimination to which disproportionate numbers of
women and minorities of colour are subjected.'
In the past few decades, particularly in the countries discussed in
this volume, various 'gender sensitive' and 'race sensitive' approaches
have been proffered. One such approach has been the adoption of a
redistributive and compensatory mechanism popularly referred to as
'affirmative action' (also referred to as reverse discrimination, benign
discrimination', and compensatory discrimination').
Affirmative action (in its various verbal configurations) raises
awkward and complicated questions about group entitlements, compensation and rights. It challenges the legal system and political edifice to
unbundle the multiple oppressions and multiple concomitant claims. In
Western democracies it confronts the tidy formal arrangement of the
individual rights regime by channelling remedies into group categories,
thereby disrupting standard notions of individual equality.
Attempts at sustaining affirmative action have generally led to widespread controversy and some hostility, particularly from those sectors of
the populace who believe themselves disadvantaged by the programs
(Carter, 1991; Thornton, 1997). So these programs (and their underlying
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policies) present a tremendous challenge to legislators and legal scholars
who seek to reconcile the demands of legal strategies sensitive to race
and gender with the seemingly contradictory demands of individual
justice. In short, the very ideal of equality is subject to intense interrogation in its attempt to strike a balance between benign and invidious
racial and gender classifications.
The purpose of this volume is to address and analyse the issue of discrimination, both adverse and compensatory. The central question
underscoring this analysis is the possibility of translating legal rights
into social and economic rights, a version of the formal versus substantive equality' debate in critical legal scholarship (Williams, 1982).
The contributors examine the tension between collectivist aspirations
which underpin the principles and policies of compensatory discrimination, and the consequences for liberal democratic theory.
Specifically the following questions are raised:
(1) What is the relationship of power and principle in the making of
law with respect to equal opportunity or distributive justice?
(2) What purposes do affirmative action legislation and policies
serve: compensation; redress; diversity; redistribution?
(3) How has the categorisation into disadvantaged minorities' improved the status of those minorities? Should economic status
form part of the equation of disadvantage?
(4) How effective has state intervention (affirmative action
legislation and policies) been? What are the mechanisms of
evaluation and assessment, and are they helpful?
The contributors to this volume provide a conceptual framework
within which to consider the vexed definition of disadvantage'. As we
approach the new millennium, the contemporary constellation of global
capital with its exciting possibilities and debilitating handicaps has
challenged the epistemological boundaries of law, and the latter's
capacity to accommodate demands for redress and justice, particularly
that of a redistributive or compensatory type.
Global perspectives, as well as case studies from Australia, the
United States, India and South Africa, highlight the contextuality and
ambiguity of identity. Yet the law's concern, under a compensatory
justice model, to classify individuals and groups as discrete identities
deserving of advantage, and their encapsulation in formal constitutional
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categories, makes this a particularly trying endeavour. Though distinguishable in their political and cultural contexts, these case studies
incorporate the narratives of political backlash and stigmatisation which
increasingly occupy a centre stage in the discourse.
It is difficult to negotiate the precise contours of affirmative action,
either as principle or policy (Edley, 1996). Notions of compensatory
justice are not confined to groups disadvantaged by historical and
contemporary discrimination based on factors such race, ethnicity or
gender. Many societies tolerate special treatment for certain designated
groups, for example, veterans and the elderly. In the United States, in
the educational setting - for example, and particularly at the elite
universities and colleges, children of alumnae and donors often receive
advantageous treatment in the admissions process. Despite this, the
debate surrounding compensatory justice for racial and ethnic minorities
and women is frequently accompanied by rancour. Everywhere the
debate embodies at least some common elements. In all the case studies
in this volume the notion of the allocation of resources based on group
identity, premised on past discrimination, appears to subvert the ideal of
equality so valorised in the jurisprudence of liberal democracies.
Whether an affirmative action policy or program is rooted in notions
of redress or compensation (for past injustices), or diversity (to represent
the multicultural reality of a particular society), or redistribution (a
political arrangement benefiting vocal minorities), all the chapters in
this volume refer to affirmative action as state imposition, through
legislation, court judgments or other mechanisms, to depart from well
established norms. In other words, they reflect intervention by the state
to ensure access to employment, education, legislative seats and other
appropriate societal goods, for targeted groups burdened by persistent
disadvantage and under-representation.
In the first chapter, Chibundu analyses both the descriptive
possibilities' and the breadth of its potentialities' in assessing
affirmative action and international law. He points to the irony that
despite the dearth of theory and practice of affirmative action in international law, proponents of affirmative action within nation states
constantly evoke international law as the wellspring for their position on
affirmative action. Chibundu deconstructs the veneer of sovereign
equality of states and the contradictions it produces: the fallacy of
equality in the face of economic inequality (between states and regions).
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This contradiction became most apparent during the period of decolonisation, even though during the early years the newly independent states
did attempt, through adroit political manoeuvring, a reconfiguration of
the operating paradigms of international law.
The international jurisprudence of state sovereignty, and the
concomitant sovereign equality of states, pose significant challenges for
the possibilities of affirmative action. Chibundu explores the benefits
and shortfalls of affirmative action by examining prior efforts towards
this in the economic arena. In this regard he discusses the Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP), adopted by the international community in
1971, which purported to advance arrangements between the wealthy
and poor nations, whereby the latter would receive preferential treatment with respect to tariff treatment, aid and imports. Chibundu cites
the political lobbying and other tactics utilised by the developing states
as not dissimilar to the approach employed in domestic affirmative
action programs. Eventually, however, as opportunism and corruption
began to plague many governments in the developing countries, they
soon lost their moral claims to equity.
Chibundu is not optimistic about affirmative action in light of global
trends in the past two decades, particularly the reification of the market
and its unchecked possibilities in regulating the global economy. He does
see some optimistic signs, namely that in some Western countries the
principle of affirmative action could be interpreted as a corollary to the
right to non-discrimination. In other words, the existence (albeit contested) of affirmative action in many societies may give such an approach
some cachet in international law. Furthermore, if affirmative action is
based on notions of contemporary need, and not compensation for past
wrongs, it may more easily acquire acceptability as a norm in international law. But Chibundu also recognises that there may be
widespread resistance to the imposition of benefits based on group
membership. In short, international law mechanisms of compensatory
justice would probably face the same hostility about the appropriateness
of deviating from the standard notion of equality, namely equal
treatment, as it has in the domestic context.
Chibundu argues that the incorporation of affirmative action in
international legal doctrine would be beneficial for two reasons: the
institutional legitimation that would accompany its adoption, and its
enabling effects on domestic legal practices. Despite this, he is not
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sanguine about the possibility of affirmative action bridging the gap
between the poor and wealthy countries, and altering the distribution of
power and influence in the international community.
Mendelsohn considers the Indian experience, often referred to as the
world's largest scheme of positive discrimination'. The preference in
question is for the Scheduled Castes (the Untouchables), the Scheduled
Tribes and Other Backward Classes. He focuses his discussion on the
Untouchables since they make up the largest group, and compensatory
discrimination for their benefit is the most significant and complex.
Mendelsohn evaluates various concessions of compensatory discrimination, including the reservation of public jobs - the most significant
benefit in the public mind. He argues that, despite the large number of
beneficiaries, the proportion of Untouchables who benefit are small
relative to the whole Untouchable population. And there have been
numerous problems in implementation of the schemes, including
bureaucratic inertia or hostility and a considerable backlash, often
violent, to the programs. Mendelsohn notes that there is little research
on the impact of Untouchable appointees on the culture or policy of the
bureaucracy. Has the culture of the bureaucracy changed in favour of
better treatment of the Untouchables? Mendelsohn concludes that other
developments and public programs have had a far greater impact than
programs of compensatory discrimination. Above all it is the growing
consciousness and appetite for education of the Untouchables themselves
that have seen them increasingly sending their children to school.
Mendelsohn is lukewarm about the benefits of reservation of
legislative seats; he concludes that, at least now if not earlier, this is the
least significant dimension of compensatory discrimination in India. But
he recognises that the value of developing a pool of experienced
legislators is more diffuse than the fruits of immediate instrumentalism,
and that the presence of Untouchable legislators appropriately reflects
the pluralism of Indian society.
Mendelsohn argues overall that despite extensive reservation of
public sector jobs, special educational benefits and reservation of legislative seats, the schemes of compensatory discrimination have not
succeeded in overcoming the poverty of a large proportion of the relevant
communities. He contrasts the overall failure of state policy with the
redistributive possibilities that were once inherent - the time is probably
now past - in radical land reform in a country where large numbers of
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people, including a great many Untouchables, are landless agricultural
labourers. Of less radical impact but more significant than compensatory
discrimination has been the effect of old-fashioned anti-discrimination
action; this has made adverse discrimination of the grossest kind no
longer so available a behaviour. The most intractable problem is no
longer gross discrimination but poverty.
In the third chapter Andrews outlines the possibilities of affirmative
action programs in South Africa since the advent of a democratic
government there in 1994. She contextualises programs of affirmative
action within the grand project of political transformation occurring
there, and highlights both its possibilities and limitations. She
distinguishes the South African experiment from others by emphasising
its redistributive potential, and its popular acceptance by the majority of
the population. Tracing the legacy of apartheid, and the political,
economic and social distortion leading to massive inequalities between
white and black South Africans, Andrews argues that affirmative action
programs are imperative if democratisation is to be meaningful. She
argues further that the specific race-conscious approach (but one which
also includes women and the disabled) does not contradict the philosophy
of non-racialism espoused by the African National Congress, the
governing party.
She describes the major provisions in the Employment Equity Act,
the first piece of affirmative action legislation promulgated in late 1998.
According to Andrews, this Act represents a careful balancing of
volunteerism and coercion, poised between corporate reticence and
labour agitation. The Act, similar to some provisions in Australia's
Affirmative Action Act, mandates concrete steps that employers have to
take to implement their affirmative action programs. The Act provides
for an advisory body which will bring together groups representing organised labour, organised business, government, blacks, women and the
disabled. The Act utilises the existing industrial relations mechanisms to
resolve disputes, and provides for the award of compensatory and
punitive damages against recalcitrant employers, as well as forbidding
against future discrimination.
Andrews outlines two significant problem areas for the
implementation of affirmative action programs, areas not confined to
South Africa but particularly poignant in the light of its recent history of
racial subordination and exclusion. The first is the issue of racial cate-
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gorisation required by affirmative action, which has the potential of
reviving the more egregious aspects of rigid racial classification
pertaining particularly to non-white (as opposed to black) South
Africans. She highlights the race to the top of the most oppressed and its
possible deleterious outcome for racial reconstruction. The second
problem area is the perennial issue about standards or merit, and their
intersection with affirmative action. Although Andrews does not seek to
repudiate the idea of merit, its normative dimensions need to be
interrogated to unearth their potentially discriminatory impact.
Andrews also focuses on the question of equality and the South
African judiciary's evolving jurisprudence in this area. She outlines the
constitutional provisions relating to equality and non-discrimination,
and the Constitutional Court's expansive definition of this concept in a
significant decision involving parental rights. She also analyses the first
successful challenge to an affirmative action program, suggesting that its
success had more to do with the program's technical deficiencies than
judicial hostility to affirmative action.
Andrews concludes that despite its popular support and
constitutional and legislative protection, affirmative action programs in
South Africa cannot on their own substitute for wholesale government
intervention to attack poverty and economic inequality.
In her contribution Banks provides a critique of legal and policy
developments in the United States, focusing on the contested terrains of
compensation (redress for past racial and gender injustice); diversity (the
vision of the workplace and major institutions of the society reflecting its
racial, ethnic and gender diversity); entitlement (the reality that the
major beneficiaries of affirmative action have been white females); and
equality (the widespread perception that affirmative action contradicts
America's vision of itself as a land of equal opportunity). She assesses
the manner in which the courts are accommodating these divergent
strands in an increasingly complex debate.
Banks details the deep divisions within the American public which
stem from competing visions of equality. Proponents of affirmative action
interpret the use of race in allocating access to resources (in
employment, education and government contracts) as indispensable to
the goal of a racially just society. Opponents of affirmative action deplore
the racialised nature of decision making, and its antithesis to the concept
of equality.
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Banks refers to the irony that the issue of affirmative action is
largely race centred, that is, the perception that whites are losing out
because blacks are favoured, when in fact white women have been the
major beneficiaries of affirmative action. She questions the latter's
silence in the face of concerted popular campaigns (through ballot
initiatives and court challenges) to roll back affirmative action programs.
Banks chronicles the major judicial developments pertaining to
affirmative action and traces the increasingly rigorous scrutiny afforded
affirmative action by the United States Supreme Court. Concentrating
mostly on affirmative action in employment, with the exception of the
Bakke decision, she traces the court's reluctant acceptance of race as a
legitimate criterion (to achieve diversity), to the current situation where,
according to the Croson and Adarand decisions, racial classifications,
even for benign purposes, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest'.
Taking her cue from critical legal theorists, particularly critical race
theorists, she laments the erosion of the policies of affirmative action and
growing hostility from the American public, and suggests that antidiscrimination measures have largely been superficial and palliative and
not designed to achieve a racially just society. She cites the Philadelphia
Plan created by the Nixon administration, much criticised by activists in
the black community for its cosmetic and inadequate efforts at racial
equity.
Banks argues that the legal requirement of racial intent has
thwarted anti-discrimination initiatives by black victims of racial
discrimination, whilst ironically proving very useful to white plaintiffs
who allege racial intent in affirmative action programs they challenge.
In fact, legal strategies adopted by victims of affirmative action
programs have been based on the promise of equality and the
imperatives of a colour blind society, arguments that the courts find
increasingly persuasive.
Banks concludes that the best rationale for compensatory
discrimination in the United States is 'positive diversity', which she
describes as an affirmative celebration of difference in American society.
Even though she recognises that this rationale may ultimately be only
judicially palatable in the educational sector, she sees its necessity in
sustaining affirmative action in the employment sector as well.
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Gaze outlines the major features of Australia's Affirmative Action
Act for Women which provides for affirmative action programs in the
private sector. (There is no similar program in place for indigenous
peoples or the disabled.) Gaze traverses the contested domain of law's
neutrality and the persistence of structural discrimination. She grounds
her arguments for the need for affirmative action in these conditions of
systemic discrimination.
Gaze contextualises the nature and scope of affirmative action in the
debates around gender and racial subordination and the absence of constitutional guarantees within which to centre rights to equality.
Although anti-discrimination
measures are incorporated (albeit
unevenly) in most State and federal legislation, she laments the Australian legal system's insistence on claims to universality and neutrality.
Consequently, the complaint-based mechanisms (with its burdensome
requirement of intent) dominates, although there are some schemes of
affirmative action for women, indigenous peoples, people from nonEnglish speaking backgrounds and disabled people in public sector
employment. These schemes largely flow from Australia's international
treaty obligations.
These affirmative action programs have survived legal challenge
because the special measures enacted have been interpreted as
temporary and therefore exempt from anti-discrimination legislation.
Gaze argues that the decisions in these cases are jurisprudentially
unhelpful because the measures in the programs are still regarded as
discrimination, although acceptable under the circumstances. The courts
and tribunals have therefore reinforced unreconstructed concepts of
affirmative action. She argues for a jurisprudence that sees affirmative
action as integral to the notion of equality, not an exception to it.
Gaze catalogues some fundamental deficiencies with the Affirmative
Action Act. She argues that because the purpose of affirmative action is
to target structural sexism within the workplace, it does not adequately
address the intersection of race and gender which affects women of
colour. She also contends that despite the existence of affirmative action
measures in both the public and private sector, traditional notions of
merit have not been subjected to appropriate scrutiny. This is so despite
their obvious disparate impact on women and members of disadvantaged
groups in Australia.
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Although Gaze sees the absolute necessity of affirmative action
measures, and notes the radical potential of the Affirmative Action Act,
she believes this potential has not been tapped because of inadequate
enforcement mechanisms and a lack of direction. Consequently the Act
has not changed women's lives dramatically. Australia's workforce
remains overwhelmingly white and largely sex-segregated; jobs in which
women traditionally have dominated continue to be undervalued.
Moreover, Gaze expresses consternation at the current political
environment in Australia, where claims to social justice, and particularly
racial justice, are met with growing hostility. In this she sees a further
erosion of the limited gains and possibilities of affirmative action.
The principle and policies of compensatory justice, either globally or
locally, will continue to be contested. But the reasons for the existence of
the schemes are all too plain: economic disparities continue to plague
many societies, and the fault lines are along the divisions of race,
ethnicity, gender and class. The contributions to this volume take these
fault lines seriously, though they do not pretend to any easy solution to
the tensions that particular programs have generated. The contributions
are at least joined in the position that the existing distribution of
resources is unfair, and that it is crucial that we address this unfairness.

Notes
1. I use American terminology to refer to ethnic and racial minorities burdened
by racial and gender discrimination. Obviously huge numbers of poor people,
who are not women or members of racial or ethnic minorities, are also
burdened by the effects of economic inequality. This volume, however,
concerns itself with the plight of women and racial and ethnic minorities.
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